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RAKOFF, District Judge. 
 Section 926A of Title 18 of the United States Code 
confers the following protection upon those who wish to 
engage in the interstate transportation of firearms: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of any law 
or any rule or regulation of a State or any 
political subdivision thereof, any person who is 
                                              
*
 The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge for the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, sitting by designation. 
  
3 
not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from 
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm 
shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any 
lawful purpose from any place where he may 
lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any 
other place where he may lawfully possess and 
carry such firearm if, during such transportation 
the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm 
nor any ammunition being transported is readily 
accessible or is directly accessible from the 
passenger compartment of such transporting 
vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle 
without a compartment separate from the 
driver’s compartment the firearm or 
ammunition shall be contained in a locked 
container other than the glove compartment or 
console. 
 
The provision amended a far more expansive entitlement to 
“transport an unloaded, not readily accessible firearm in 
interstate commerce,” which was passed just two months 
earlier as part of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act. See 
Pub. L. No. 99–308, § 107(a), 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 99–360, § 1(a), 100 Stat. 766 (July 8, 
1986). The question before us is whether section 926A, as 
amended, creates a right enforceable by the appellant, the 
Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs Inc. (“the 
Association”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 
 The Association’s cause of action seeks injunctive 
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would enjoin the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey and Scott Erickson 
(collectively, the “Port Authority”) from enforcing certain 
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New Jersey statutes, which prohibit possession of a firearm 
without a permit and possession of hollow-point 
ammunition,
1
 against non-resident members of the 
Association “who are entitled to transport firearms through 
New Jersey pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926A.” J.A. at 26-30. 
The Association seeks this relief because, it alleges, the Port 
Authority enforces these state gun laws in Newark Airport 
against non-resident members of the Association, who are 
thus “coerced and intimidated into taking one of two courses 
of action: (i) When traveling with firearms . . . they avoid 
Newark Airport and other Port Authority sites to avoid 
unlawful arrest and/or detention . . . even though they have a 
right . . . to travel unmolested through such locations with 
firearms; or (ii) . . . they refrain from possessing firearms 
when traveling through Newark Airport and other Port 
Authority sites . . . .” Id. at 29.2  
 
                                              
 
1
 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–5(b) and N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:39–3(f). 
2
 In a prior non-precedential decision, another panel of this 
Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of this case on 
standing grounds and directed the District Court to permit the 
Association to amend its complaint to allege facts sufficient 
to demonstrate standing. See Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and 
N.J., 321 F. App’x 113 (3d Cir. 2009). The Association did so 
by properly asserting the rights of its non-resident members. 
While the Concurring Opinion below references a second 
reported opinion in Revell, the panel in that case expressly 
declined to reach the question before us. See Revell v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 136 n.13 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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On August 20, 2012, the district court granted the Port 
Authority’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 
section 926A does not create a right enforceable under section 
1983. Because we hold that, in enacting the amended section 
926A, Congress did not intend to confer the right upon the 
Association’s non-resident members that the Association 
seeks to enforce in this case, we affirm. 
 
 Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under 
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the 
United States. On its face, section 1983 provides a remedy for 
a violation of federal rights, privileges, or immunities, but 
“not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 
520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
536 U.S. 273, 283–90 (2002). Determining whether a federal 
statute creates a federal right enforceable under section 1983 
is a two-step process.  
 
The first step is to determine whether the federal 
statute creates a federal right. To make this determination, 
three requirements must be met. “First, Congress must have 
intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. 
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right 
assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial 
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a 
binding obligation on the States . . . [i.e., it] must be couched 
in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” Blessing, 520 
U.S. at 340–41 (internal citations omitted).  
 
If all three requirements are met, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that the statute creates a right enforceable 
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under section 1983. In such circumstances, “[p]laintiffs suing 
under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing an intent to 
create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a 
remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal 
statutes.” Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284. However, in the 
second step of the Blessing analysis, this presumption may be 
overcome if a defendant shows that Congress has either 
expressly or impliedly foreclosed the section 1983 remedy for 
that particular right. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. “Implied” 
foreclosure of a remedy -- the more elusive rebuttal to the 
presumption that a federal right has a remedy under section 
1983 -- means that notwithstanding the fact that Congress 
created an individual right with a given statute, Congress also 
“creat[ed] a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id. 
 
 In our view, plaintiff here has failed to satisfy even the 
first requirement of the first step of the process, i.e., that 
Congress intended that section 926A benefit this particular 
plaintiff. This is evident from the plain meaning of the statute. 
Although the unwieldy sentence that comprises section 926A 
is drafted in a roundabout way, on a careful reading its 
language is clear and unambiguous. It begins by establishing 
a clear positive entitlement: a person who meets its 
requirements “shall be entitled” to transport firearms in 
certain circumstances. Cf. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 
(contrasting the rights-creating language of “no person . . . 
shall be . . . subjected” with language typical of spending 
clause statutes, e.g., “no funds shall be made available.”). But 
the part of the sentence that immediately follows expressly 
conditions this entitlement as only being operative “if, during 
such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the 
firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily 
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accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger 
compartment of such transporting vehicle.” 18 U.S.C. § 926A 
(emphasis supplied). 
 
It is plain from the latter condition that the statute 
protects only transportation of a firearm in a vehicle, and 
requires that the firearm and ammunition be neither readily 
nor directly accessible from the passenger compartment of 
such vehicle. In particular, the word “such,” in “such 
transporting vehicle,” by definition refers back to earlier 
part(s) of the sentence, and the only parts it could possibly 
refer to are the parts referring to the transportation of a 
firearm or ammunition. The use of “such” therefore makes 
clear that the transportation the statute protects must occur in 
a “transporting vehicle.”   
 
Moreover, if there were any doubt about the statute’s 
vehicular limitation, the final part of the sentence that follows 
-- the “Provided” clause -- again makes clear that only 
vehicular transportation is included in the statutory grant. It 
states: “Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a 
compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the 
firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked 
container other than the glove compartment or console.” 18 
U.S.C. § 926A (emphasis supplied). This clause, on its face, 
presupposes transportation of the firearm in a vehicle.  
 
It follows from this plain meaning that an ambulatory 
plaintiff who intends to transit through Newark Airport is 
outside the coverage of the statute.
3
 But it is precisely such 
                                              
 
3
 We note that our reading of the statute is perfectly 
consistent with the view that the statute might protect travel 
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people whose alleged rights under section 926A the 
Association seeks here to vindicate.  
 
Despite the plain meaning of the statute, the 
Association urges this Court to conclude that the “readily 
accessible” clause is “grammatically disconnected” from the 
rest of the statute and thus that the “operative entitlement” of 
the statute contemplates non-vehicular transportation of 
firearms. Aside from its violation of the most elementary 
rules of grammar and punctuation, this argument posits the 
absurdity that Congress intended  -- in a single sentence, no 
less -- to create two disjunctive categories, one cabined with 
all kinds of conditions and the other with none. Thus, on this 
reading, the Association argues that because the first clause of 
the sentence is divorced from the rest, its members should be 
able to walk through Newark airport with their firearms in, 
for example, their wheeled luggage or in holsters attached to 
their belts. To account for the remainder of the sentence, the 
Association argues that it simply provides limitations on the 
special case of firearms and ammunition that are transported 
by vehicle.  
 
This otherwise grammatically strained disjunctive 
reading of the statute, the Association argues, avoids the sin 
of rendering “directly” redundant to “readily,” since both 
                                                                                                     
that occurs via aircraft or train—each of these modes of travel 
might be considered “vehicular.” The relevant question is 
whether ambulatory travel (i.e., walking) through an airport 
terminal is also protected by the statute. 
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terms purportedly convey the same meaning.
4
 Yet “readily” 
and “directly” are clearly not redundant adverbs, and reading 
them both as part of the same limitation upon the permissible 
accessibility of a firearm in a “transporting vehicle” offends 
no grammatical rule. On the contrary, reading “readily 
accessible” and “directly accessible” as both modifying the 
extent to which firearms and ammunition can be “accessible 
from the passenger compartment of such transporting 
vehicle” gives meaning to all of the statute’s terms: a key 
requirement of any statutory construction. That is to say, 
reading them as part of the same continuous entitlement to 
transport firearms in vehicles (i.e., the guns and ammunition 
must be neither readily nor directly accessible from the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle) renders neither adverb 
superfluous, and permits the Court to make sense of the final 
clause “such transporting vehicle” without re-writing the 
statute to read “a transporting vehicle,” as the Association’s 
reading would in effect require. 
 
                                              
 
4
 While the Concurring Opinion states that the 
Association’s reading of the statute is not “untenable,” we 
respectfully disagree. The critical word is “such” in “such 
transporting vehicle.” “Such is properly used as an adjective 
when reference has previously been made to a category of 
persons or things.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern 
Legal Usage, 526-27 (1987). As noted, the only possible 
antecedent to which “such transporting vehicle” could refer is 
the transporting of a firearm mentioned in the main clause of 
the statute, from which it follows that both of the limiting 
conditions following the word “if” refer to vehicle 
transportation. 
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Furthermore, the Association’s reading is unable to 
sensibly account for the “Provided” clause (“Provided, That 
in the case of a vehicle without a compartment . . .”). Under 
our straightforward reading, the proviso presumes, once 
more, that the protected transportation must be in a vehicle. 
But under the Association’s reading, the proviso is entirely 
unnecessary, for while, e.g., storage of a firearm in a glove 
box would possibly evade the limitation that firearms not be 
“directly” accessible in a vehicle, storage in the glove box 
would already be prohibited by the supposedly freestanding 
limitation that the firearms cannot be “readily accessible.” It 
is not credible that Congress would have added the entire 
“Provided” clause when, on the Association’s reading, it was 
entirely unnecessary.  See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
758, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion by Scalia, J.) (noting the 
“cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision 
should be construed to be entirely redundant”).  
 
 And there is more, for even assuming, arguendo, some 
ambiguity in the wording of section 926A -- and we find none 
-- the legislative history strongly supports the view that the 
amended statute protects only vehicular transportation of 
firearms and ammunition. To be sure, the unusual 
circumstances attending the enactment of section 926A mean 
that the kind of legislative history to which we ordinarily 
accord the greatest weight, such as committee reports, is 
irrelevant here, since section 926A was the result of a last-
minute amendment proposed on the floor of the Senate. See 
David T. Hardy, The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act: A 
Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 585, 625, 
677 (1987). Nevertheless, “its late origin has given us a 
legislative history adequate to address most issues.” Id. at 
678. 
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The present version of section 926A was intended to 
forge a compromise between those who supported the much 
broader version passed earlier and those who favored its total 
repeal. As Senator Kennedy noted when the current, final 
version of section 926A came to a vote in the Senate:  
 
I would just like to note that in the compromise 
reached on the interstate transportation portions 
of the bill, it is the clear intent of the Senate that 
State and local laws governing the 
transportation of firearms are only affected if—
first, an individual is transporting a firearm that 
is not directly accessible from the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle. That means it cannot 
be in the glove compartment, under the seat, or 
otherwise within reach. The only exception to 
this is when a vehicle does not have a trunk or 
other compartment separate from the passenger 
area. The weapon must be contained in a locked 
container other than the glove compartment or 
console. Second, any ammunition being 
transported must be similarly secured. 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 9607 (May 6, 1986). 
5
 
                                              
 
5
 In reviewing the legislative history of section 926A, 
it is crucial to distinguish which of the two versions of section 
926A a given speaker or committee is describing. As noted 
above, the current section 926A narrowed a far more 
expansive version contained in the Firearm Owners’ 
Protection Act. Statements describing the earlier version of 
section 926A reveal that the problem Congress initially 
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intended to remedy was that “[u]nder current law, such 
persons can be prosecuted under some State and local gun 
laws even where they are simply on a hunting trip, traveling 
to a sporting event, or moving.” See 131 Cong. Rec. S18177-
78 (July 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Dole). Thus, in some 
statements made while considering the current version, some 
members, in passing, referred back to this earlier purpose. 
See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H4102-03 (Jun 24, 1986) (statement 
of Rep. Hughes) (“[T]he purpose which everyone supported 
was to allow travelers who lawfully possessed weapons to 
travel to hunting grounds in other States.”). Such statements, 
which speak retrospectively about an earlier form of section 
926A, do not bear upon the purpose of the current statute, 
which was intended as a compromise to address concerns 
about the expansiveness of the predecessor entitlement. The 
reason why the current language and the previous language of 
the statute were discussed at the same time was that, as part of 
a “horse trade” designed to prevent filibuster, the Senate first 
passed FOPA, including the “broader” predecessor of 926A, 
but immediately acted to amend 926A. See generally Hardy, 
supra, at 625. Unlike the statements quoted in the Concurring 
Opinion, infra, Senator Kennedy’s statements on the floor of 
the Senate, excerpted in full above, reflect the narrowed, 
compromise version of 926A that is the current federal law. 
As the final pre-vote statement summarizing the nature of the 
compromise reached, Senator Kennedy’s statement is entitled 
to particular weight. The broader statements of opponents of 
the compromise, by contrast, are, given this legislative 
history, largely irrelevant. Of similarly diminished utility are 
statements that appear in committee reports relating to still 
earlier versions of the Firearm Owners Protection Act, which 
had a long and tortured history in Congress, see id., though 
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In light of the plain meaning of the statute, fully 
corroborated by the legislative history, we hold that section 
926A benefits only those who wish to transport firearms in 
vehicles—and not, therefore, any of the kinds of 
“transportation” that, by necessity, would be involved should 
a person like those represented by the Association wish to 
transport a firearm by foot through an airport terminal or Port 
Authority site. Here, the Association seeks injunctive relief 
that would permit its nonresident members to travel 
“unmolested” through Port Authority sites such as airports. 
Self-evidently, such travel must occur outside a vehicle, and 
thus will, in every instance, bring the Association’s members 
outside the particular class of persons to whom Congress 
intended to confer a right under section 926A. Consequently, 
the Association has no federal right to invoke and thus cannot 
avail itself of section 1983. 
 
 We are mindful that a divided panel of the Second 
Circuit -- in addressing the overall question of whether 
persons like those represented by the Association have a 
remedy under section 1983 for purported violations of section 
                                                                                                     
we note that even committee reports regarding the most 
expansive draft versions of section 926A assume that the 
statute’s protection would extend only to vehicular 
transportation. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-583, at 28 (1984) (“It 
is anticipated that the firearms being transported will be made 
inaccessible in a way consistent with the mode of 
transportation—in a trunk or locked glove compartment in 
vehicles which have such containers, or in a case or similar 
receptacle in vehicles which do not.”) and S. Rep. No. 97-
476, at 25 (1982). 
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926A -- reached the same result as we do, but for different 
reasons. See Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 
129 (2d Cir. 2010).  The majority of that panel held that 
section 926A does not create an enforceable right because its 
terms are too vague and amorphous to satisfy the second 
Blessing factor. See id. at 139. In a concurrence (the 
reasoning of which was adopted by the District Court in our 
case), Judge Wesley disagreed that the statute was so vague 
and amorphous as to strain judicial competence, but 
nevertheless found that under the “second step” of the 
Blessing framework, Congress had impliedly foreclosed a 
section 1983 action under the statute insofar as it enacted 
section 926A against the background of the “remedial 
mechanisms” of direct appeal and collateral attack of criminal 
convictions. Id. at 150. Because, Judge Wesley reasoned, 
collateral attacks upon criminal convictions are subjected to 
particular procedures by the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Congress has 
“impliedly” foreclosed a section 1983 remedy for violations 
of rights established by section 926A. Because, however, we 
find the first of the Blessing factors dispositive, and conclude 
that Congress did not intend the amended section 926A to 
benefit those who wish to transport firearms outside of 
vehicles, we need not reach the concerns that motivated our 
sister Circuit in Torraco. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
AFFIRMED 
 1 
 
Assoc. of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Port Authority of 
N.Y. & N.J., et al. (No. 12-3621) 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
My colleagues in the Majority have set forth a 
plausible reading of § 926A, but I am not as convinced as 
they are that the statute is clearly limited to vehicular travel.  
Here is the language again: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of any law 
or any rule or regulation of a State or any 
political subdivision thereof, any person who is 
not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from 
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm 
shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any 
lawful purpose from any place where he may 
lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any 
other place where he may lawfully possess and 
carry such firearm if, during such transportation 
the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm 
nor any ammunition being transported is readily 
accessible or is directly accessible from the 
passenger compartment of such transporting 
vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle 
without a compartment separate from the 
driver’s compartment the firearm or 
ammunition shall be contained in a locked 
container other than the glove compartment or 
console. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 926A. 
 
 2 
 
Awkwardly worded though the statute may be, it can 
reasonably be construed as a comprehensive defense for 
people traveling with firearms.  Of particular importance in 
this case, § 926A provides that the transported firearms must 
not be either “readily accessible” or “directly accessible from 
the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle.”  Id.  
The disjunctive “or” can be read as providing two separate 
limitations on the transportation of a firearm.  That view is 
supported by contrasting § 926A’s current language with its 
prior version, which provided: 
 
Any person not prohibited by this chapter from 
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm 
shall be entitled to transport an unloaded, not 
readily accessible firearm in interstate 
commerce notwithstanding any provision of any 
legislation enacted, or any rule or regulation 
prescribed by any State or political subdivision 
thereof. 
 
Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986).  The “not 
readily accessible” requirement has remained in the current 
version, with the addition of the not “directly accessible” 
requirement when transporting a firearm in a passenger 
vehicle.  That addition thus can be seen as reinforcing the 
conclusion that, while the words “directly accessible” do 
relate specifically to vehicular travel, the words “readily 
accessible” do not.1  
                                            
1
 What the Majority calls the “Provided clause” – that 
is, the last sentence of the statute, which states: “Provided, 
That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate 
from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition 
 3 
 
 The Majority calls that reading of the statute 
“strained.”  (Maj. Op. at 8.)  I disagree.  There are 
grammatical difficulties with the statute, no matter how it is 
approached, but that does not make the broader reading 
untenable.
2
  Indeed, the disjunctive clauses in § 926A are 
                                                                                                  
shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove 
compartment or console,” 18 U.S.C. § 926A – does not 
foreclose the broader reading noted here.  That clause can be 
understood as merely an additional limitation if the 
transportation of a firearm occurs in a vehicle without a 
compartment separate from the driver’s compartment. 
2
 The Majority focuses on the word “such” in “such 
transporting vehicle” (Maj. Op. at 8 n.4,), saying that “such” 
is appropriately used only when there has been a previous 
reference to “a category of persons or things.”  (Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  My colleagues therefore contend 
that “the only possible antecedent to which ‘such transporting 
vehicle’ could refer is the transporting of a firearm mentioned 
in the main clause of the statute.”  (Id.)  But there is no 
antecedent category of persons or things in the statute.  The 
word “vehicle” appears nowhere before the phrase “such 
transporting vehicle.”  That deficiency leads to at least two 
interpretive possibilities: (1) we insert the word “vehicle” into 
the statutory language before introducing “such transporting 
vehicle,” the approach the Majority favors, or (2) we 
conclude that Congress failed to follow the proper rules of 
grammatical construction when using “such.”  Either is a 
possible reading of the statutory language, and the latter is no 
more strained than the former.  Rather than wrestle with 
grammar, I believe, as discussed below, that we should focus 
on the one thing that is clear about § 926A: it does not permit 
§ 1983 liability.     
 4 
 
each introduced separately by the word “is” (“is readily 
accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger 
compartment”).  The reading the Majority adopts – which ties 
“readily accessible” to the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle – would be more persuasive if the statute were 
phrased with a single copula, thus: “… neither the firearm nor 
any ammunition being transported is readily or directly 
accessible from the passenger compartment of such 
transporting vehicle.”  But that is not how Congress wrote the 
statute, and, despite my colleagues insistence to the contrary, 
their reading renders the words “directly accessible” 
superfluous.     
 
Although there is legislative history supporting the 
Majority’s narrow reading of the protection afforded by 
§ 926A, there are other portions of the legislative history that 
support a broader reach for the statute.
3
  Given such 
                                            
3
 Certain parts of the legislative history cast the 
protection more broadly, speaking of “travel” generally, 
rather than specifically of vehicles.  See 132 Cong. Rec. 
H4102-03 (Jun 24, 1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes) (“[T]he 
purpose which everyone supported was to allow travelers 
who lawfully possessed weapons to travel to hunting grounds 
in other States ... .”); see also 131 Cong. Rec. S9101-05 (July 
9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Dole) (explaining that § 926A 
was necessary because, “[u]nder current law, such persons 
can be prosecuted under some State and local gun laws even 
where they are simply on a hunting trip, traveling to a 
sporting event, or moving”).  The Majority attempts to 
discount that history as irrelevant because it pertains to the 
previous version of the statute.  (Maj. Op. at 11 n.5.)  Not so.  
The legislative history for § 926A indicates that its current 
 5 
 
                                                                                                  
language and the previous language were discussed at the 
same time and, in fact, before the previous language became 
law, amendments had already been proposed.  See, e.g., 132 
Cong. Rec. S5358-04 (May 6, 1986) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (explaining that amendments to the previous version 
of § 926A would not compromise its substance); 131 Cong. 
Rec. S9101-05 (July 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Symms) 
(discussing proposed amendments to the previous version of 
§ 926A, which had not yet been passed).  Moreover, the 
legislative history the Majority leans on is from a single 
member of Congress, which is something we have 
traditionally been careful to eschew.  See In re Channel Home 
Ctrs., Inc., 989 F.2d 682, 685 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e 
refuse to attribute so much significance to a single word 
uttered by a single member of Congress, even one in a 
position of particular authority with respect to the legislation 
in question.”); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety 
Comm’n, 598 F.2d 790, 811 (3d Cir. 1979) (“It goes without 
saying that the views of a single member of Congress 
concerning the appropriate interpretation of a statutory 
provision passed some years earlier are not dispositive.”).  
Therefore, instead of looking at the previous statutory 
language as its own piece of legislation, it is more appropriate 
in this particular case to view § 926A’s legislative history as 
an amalgamation of the debates from both the current § 926A 
and its previous version.  As the Majority notes, the 
congressional debates from as far back as 1984 discussed 
vehicular travel.  (Maj. Op. at 11 n.5.)  That, however, does 
nothing to add clarity to § 926A’s meaning.  It arguably does 
the opposite, because the more broadly worded version of 
§ 926A was enacted after those 1984 debates.  Given the 
subsequent legislative history I have noted here, it is certainly 
 6 
 
conflicting history, resort to the legislative record is not 
particularly helpful.  Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 185 
                                                                                                  
ambiguous whether Congress meant to limit § 926A, or 
whether it sought a broader application to planes, trains, and 
automobiles.  
In fact, the Majority concedes that § 926A can cover 
travel by planes, trains, and automobiles.  (Maj. Op. at 7 n.3.)  
That concession leads to a puzzlement: given the Majority’s 
interpretation of § 926A, how does one get to the airport or 
train station, check one’s luggage containing a firearm, but 
still come under the protection of § 926A?  It may be easy to 
say, as the government did during oral argument, that 
travelling by plane is permissible, as long as the airport the 
traveler is departing from is within a state in which he is 
permitted to carry a firearm.  But that hardly seems to be the 
purpose of the statute.  For if that were the case, the statute 
would be of very limited utility, as air passengers were never 
likely to face prosecution by the states whose air space they 
traversed.  The purpose of the statute seems more likely to be 
the protection of, for example, a traveler who lives in Easton, 
Pennsylvania, and wishes to go hunting in Montana.  The 
closest place likely to offer a variety of flights is not in the 
traveler’s home state, but is in New Jersey, at the Newark 
Liberty International Airport.  Accepting the Majority’s 
concession, but not its statutory interpretation, that traveler 
comes within § 926A’s scope.  But if the Majority’s statutory 
interpretation is controlling, that traveler faces prosecution 
when attempting to make his trip, unless he has a carry permit 
in New Jersey.  Despite the Majority’s disclaimer, its 
interpretation of § 926A appears to effectively limit the 
statutory protection to travel by private vehicles.     
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& n.3 (1991) (eschewing reliance on legislative history that 
was conflicting and ambiguous).   
 
  What can be helpful is a consideration of how others 
have read the statutory text.  The availability of a broader 
reading of the statute is apparent from the Second Circuit’s 
competing opinions in Torraco v. Port Authority of New York 
& New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010).  The majority 
opinion in that case held that § 926A’s language did not 
indicate a congressional intent to make the statute redressable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 139.  The concurrence, by 
contrast, indicated that the statutory language could be read to 
evince such an intent but that the remedial scheme associated 
with § 926A was such that Congress had foreclosed recourse 
to § 1983 by implication.  Id.  at 152.  Significantly, no one 
on the Torraco panel concluded that § 926A is limited to 
vehicular travel.  One may take issue with the conclusions 
they reached (and they disagreed among themselves), but 
those judges were not indulging in an outlandish reading of 
the statute.  Nor was the District Court whose reasoning we 
now have under review.  That Court concluded, in keeping 
with the Torraco concurrence, that although § 926A’s 
language could be read to permit a § 1983 action, Congress 
had impliedly foreclosed any such private remedy.  The Court 
did not adopt an “only for vehicular travelers” view of 
§ 926A.   
 
In short, § 926A is not the plain and unambiguous 
statute that the Majority portrays, and it is not a stretch to 
think that it was meant to protect interstate travel by many 
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means, not just in private vehicles.
4
  Rather than dive into the 
difficulty of interpreting the scope of § 926A’s coverage, 
                                            
4
 See supra note 3.  I note that the interpretation the 
Majority proposes is difficult to reconcile with our previous 
decision in this very case.  Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
598 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2010).  Specifically, Revell was 
delayed in traveling from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, and was forced to stay overnight in a hotel in 
Newark, New Jersey.  Id. at 130-31.  Within his luggage, 
which he collected at Newark Airport after realizing he would 
have to stay overnight, was a firearm in a locked container, as 
well as hollow-point ammunition, also in a locked container.  
Id. at 131.  After returning to the airport the next day, he was 
arrested by the Port Authority for carrying a firearm without a 
license, in violation of New Jersey law.  Id.  He brought suit 
and sought redress under § 1983.  We held that he did not 
come within the ambit of § 926A’s protection because he had 
his firearm and ammunition in his luggage, which 
accompanied him to his hotel room.  Id. at 139.  “Revell thus 
had access to his firearm and ammunition during his stay at 
the New Jersey hotel, whether or not he in fact accessed them 
and regardless of whether they were accessible while he was 
traveling by plane or van.  That crucial fact takes Revell 
outside the scope of § 926A’s protection.”  Id. at 137.  We 
thus concluded that it was the prolonged time Revell had with 
his luggage that brought him outside of § 926A’s protection 
because he had ready access to his firearm.  Under the 
Majority’s interpretation of § 926A, our decision in Revell 
should not have hinged upon Revell spending the night in his 
hotel with his suitcase; we should have concluded that, as 
soon as he was outside of an automobile, he was outside the 
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which is an unnecessary adventure at present, I would affirm 
the District Court’s conclusion that § 926A simply does not 
support a claim for relief under § 1983.   
 
As explained by the Majority, § 1983 provides a cause 
of action against anyone who, acting under color of state law, 
deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Redress under § 1983 is limited, however, to a “violation of a 
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law,” and 
courts must determine whether a federal statute confers a 
redressable federal “right.”  Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 340 (1997) (emphasis omitted).  Again as the Majority 
notes, the Supreme Court’s decision in Blessing lays out three 
factors to consider when determining whether “[a] statute 
creates enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within 
the meaning of § 1983.”  Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 
283 F.3d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  First, “Congress must have intended that the 
provision in question benefit the plaintiff”; second “the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected 
by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and third 
“the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation 
on the States ... [;] the provision giving rise to the asserted 
right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, 
terms.”  Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41.  In Gonzaga University 
v. Doe, the Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff cannot 
succeed just by falling within the general zone of interest that 
the statute is intended to protect.  536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).  
                                                                                                  
protection of § 926A.  But that is not the interpretative route 
we took. 
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Rather, the statute must “unambiguously confer[] [a] right to 
support a cause of action brought under § 1983.”  Id.  We 
have interpreted Gonzaga and Blessing to require, in addition 
to satisfaction of the three Blessing factors, that a statute 
contain “rights-creating language which clearly imparts an 
individual entitlement with an unmistakable focus on the 
benefitted class.”  Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen 
Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
The paradigmatic examples of such language are found 
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that 
“No person in the United States shall ... be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance” on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, which states that “No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex ... be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a).  The inquiry into whether Congress intended to 
create a federal right redressable under § 1983 overlaps and is 
informed by the precedents on implied rights of action.  
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284.  For example, in Gonzaga, the 
Supreme Court examined the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”), which states that “[n]o 
funds shall be made available” to any “educational agency or 
institution,” which has a prohibited “policy or practice.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).  The Court concluded that that 
language did not contain sufficient rights-creating language, 
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287, and thus did not create rights 
enforceable under § 1983.  Id. at 290. 
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 I am unconvinced that § 926A contains the requisite 
“rights-creating language” to “clearly impart[] an individual 
entitlement with an unmistakable focus on the benefitted 
class.”  Grammer, 570 F.3d at 526.  While the statute does 
speak specifically of benefiting a person, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 926A (stating that “any person who is not otherwise 
prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or 
receiving a firearm shall be entitled” to transport that 
firearm), there is a crucial difference between the language of 
§ 926A and the language used in Titles VI and IX.  Section 
926A appears to be framed only as a legal defense to a state 
prosecution for illegal firearm possession.  Its location in the 
criminal code indicates that Congress did not intend to confer 
upon travelers a new federal cause of action, but wanted only 
to shield travelers from a certain variety of criminal liability.  
It is noteworthy in this regard that in 18 U.S.C. § 925A, a 
statute under the same title and one section away from 
§ 926A, Congress provided a specific civil remedy to people 
who are subject to the “erroneous denial of [a] firearm,” 
saying, that such a person 
 
may bring an action against the State or political 
subdivision responsible for providing the 
erroneous information, or responsible for 
denying the transfer, or against the United 
States, as the case may be, for an order directing 
that the erroneous information be corrected or 
that the transfer be approved, as the case may 
be.   
 
18 U.S.C. § 925A(2).  So, Congress knew how to be 
unambiguous about conferring new private rights of action in 
this field, when it wanted to grant them.   
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 Moreover, the tremendous impracticality of subjecting 
local law enforcement officials to liability on the basis of 
§ 926A militates against any conclusion that a redressable 
substantive right was intended by Congress.  As we explained 
the last time this case was before us, threatening police 
officers with § 1983 liability would force them to “investigate 
the laws of the jurisdiction from which the traveler was 
traveling and the laws of the jurisdiction to which the traveler 
was going prior to making an arrest.”  Revell v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 137 n.15 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Without some clearer expression 
of congressional intent, I cannot conclude that § 926A was 
meant to impose on the police such a potentially burdensome 
requirement, with the risk of civil liability hanging over them.  
Cf. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 286 (“[W]here the text and structure 
of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to 
create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit 
… under § 1983.”).   
 
Because Congress did not, in enacting § 926A, 
unambiguously confer upon travelers any right redressable 
under § 1983, I would affirm the decision of the District 
Court on that basis, and on that basis alone.  I therefore 
concur in the judgment.   
